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To start, the majority's approach provides no meaningful guidance on the intermedia scope of the nondiscrimination principle. The majority, however, does not flinch at the prospect of intermedia discrimination. The majority dismisses the risk of governmental abuse under the Arkansas tax scheme on the ground that the number of media actors exposed to the tax is "large." Ante, at 449. According to the majority, where a tax is generally applicable to nonmedia enterprises, the selective application of that tax to different segments of the media offends the First Amendment only if the tax is limited to "a small number of speakers," ante, at 448, for it is only under those circumstances that selective taxation "resembles a penalty for particular speakers or particular ideas," ante, at 449. The selective sales tax at issue in Arkansas Writers' Project, the majority points out, applied to no more than three magazines. Indeed, the majority so adamantly proclaims the irrelevance of this problem that its analysis calls into question whether any general obligation to treat media actors even-handedly survives today's decision. But the majority fails to pinpoint the magic number between three and one hundred actors above which discriminatory taxation can be accomplished with impunity.

In addition, the majority's focus on absolute numbers fails to reflect the concerns that inform the nondiscrimination principle. Even more important, the majority's focus on absolute numbers ignores the potential for abuse inherent in the State's power to discriminate based on medium identity. Indeed, the facts of this case highlight the potential for governmental abuse inherent in the power to discriminate among like-situated media based on their identities. Section 221(4) provides, indeed, one of the standards by which the court makes that determination. With important functions, equipment, and technology, the interconnective components must be built to rigorous standards. See id., at 578, 581-582, 103 S.Ct., at 1368, 1369-1370. Second, we have held that the non-discrimination principle prohibits the State from taxing individual members of the press unequally. This Court has long recognized that the freedom of the press prohibits government from using the tax power to discriminate against individual members of the media or against the media as a whole. Moreover, it is the bankruptcy court that is in the best position to know what work was done by the fee claimant, how important and involved it was, how much it benefited the whole group of security holders and how much it benefited the one class alone, how much of it was necessary, how much of it was effective.

Certainly where, as in this case, the services benefited in part the estate and in part one class of security holders, it is the bankruptcy court that is in the position to weigh the interrelated issues of fact and make a fair allocation between the two. The record in this case furnishes ample support for the conclusion that the State's cable operators make unique contributions to the information market. See ibid. The only justification that the State asserts for taxing cable operators more heavily than newspapers, magazines, television broadcasters and radio stations is its interest in raising revenue. Thus, to the extent that selective taxation makes it harder for Arkansas' 100 cable operators to compete with Arkansas' 500 newspapers, magazines, and broadcast television and radio stations, see 1 Gale Directory of Publications and Broadcast Media 67-68 (123d ed. As the Court explained in Grosjean, the purpose of the Free Press Clause "was to preserve an untrammeled press as a vital source of public information." 297 U.S., at 250, 56 S.Ct., at 449. Reviewing both the historical abuses associated with England's infamous " 'taxes on knowledge' " and the debates surrounding ratification of the Constitution, see id., at 246-250, 56 S.Ct., at 447-449; Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S., at 583-586, and nn.

See 481 U.S., at 229, 107 S.Ct., at 1727 (emphasis added); see also Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra (tax applied only to newspapers that meet circulation threshold unconstitutionally discriminates against more widely circulated newspapers). Arkansas. Ibid. (emphasis added). If Minneapolis Star, Arkansas Writers' Project, and Grosjean stand for anything, it is that the "power to tax" does not include "the power to discriminate" when the press is involved. Thus, as an alternative ground in Minneapolis Star, we concluded that the State's use tax violated the First Amendment because it exempted the first $100,000 worth of ink and paper consumed and thus effectively singled out large publishers for a disproportionate tax burden. My first go through I didn't want the spacer hanging out the bottom of the stick. The nondiscrimination principle is an instance of government's general First Amendment obligation not to interfere with the press as an institution. Because I believe the majority has unwisely cut back on the principles that inform our selective-taxation precedents, and because I believe that the First Amendment prohibits the State from singling out a particular information medium for heavier tax burdens than are borne by like-situated media, I dissent.

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